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European Union banana policies do not make economic sense, and hence criticism
of these policies is justi®ed. Some facts should, though, be remembered. If the EU
had chosen free trade in bananas when the Single Market was established, certain
producers both inside and outside the EU would have lost income, and it proved
politically impossible to choose direct ®nancial compensation. Also, the quantit-
ative implications of the new EU banana regime may be less than sometimes
assumed, as trade has not been reduced very much. The WTO's role is not to
judge the economic merits of these policies, but their legal justi®cation.
1. Comment on Brent Borrell's article `Policy-making in the EU'
Brent Borrell has engaged one more time in his well-known criticism of
EU banana policies, and has done so very forcefully in this article. To
comment on this article, as I have been asked to do, is not easy, for
several reasons. First, Borrell is obviously right in the basic thrust of his
criticism. EU banana policies do not make economic sense. For an
economist with a liberal mind, it is simply impossible to defend those
policies. Second, the type of quantitative analysis Borrell has presented
over the years is fundamentally appropriate. One may disagree with some
of the assumptions, parameters and statistics he uses, however, this does
not undermine the overall message conveyed by Borrell's analysis. Third,
the policy alternatives suggested by Borrell are de®nitely superior to
current EU banana policies. From an economic perspective, free trade in
bananas and the provision of direct and uncoupled support to EU and
ACP banana producers are without any doubt preferable. Finally, as a
German, a citizen of the EU country most negatively aected by, and
most critical of, EU banana policies, I feel even less inclined to disagree
with Borrell's conclusions. Moreover, for more than two decades in my
professional life as an analyst of agricultural policies I have argued for
trade liberalisation and uncoupled support. Indeed, on many occasions I
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licensing arrangements and market sharing agreements in agricultural
trade. Why should I then contradict Borrell's point of view?
In this comment I shall, therefore, not defend EU banana policies. I
shall, rather, make three points which may help to broaden the perspective.
First, there was a political reason why the EU adopted its current policy.
Second, the negative implications of this policy may be somewhat less
pronounced than suggested by Borrell. Third, the role of the WTO in this
story may be somewhat dierent from what Borrell appears to suggest.
2. Political reasons for EU current policy
Borrell rightly describes the origins of the current regime, starting with the
dierent trade policies on bananas which the individual EU member states
had before 1993. Clearly, these disparate policies could not be continued
when the Single Market was established and required the abolition of
border controls among EU member states. Of course, one option at the
time would have been to adopt Germany's free trade regime for the whole
of the EU. The large economic losses which then would have occurred for
EU and ACP banana producers could have been compensated through
direct payments, which ideally would have been made in an uncoupled
fashion, very much like Borrell suggests. Two major political reasons
argued against that option, and continue to argue against such a regime as
an alternative to current policies. First, the EU budget is tight, and it is
not easy to make the sums required available. Second, the producers
concerned, in particular the ACP countries, did not want to be seen
receiving these openly visible transfers. At the same time, the ACP
countries concerned, and the respective banana-producing territories of the
EU, feared that the consequent adjustments in their production structure,
away from bananas, might be too socially disruptive.
In essence, these are the same arguments which farmers and agricultural
policy-makers have always raised against proposals that agricultural price
support should be replaced by uncoupled payments. We economists know
these arguments, and we have counter-argued all the time. In domestic
agricultural policies we have actually made some progress, and agricultural
policy-makers around the world have now begun to embark on policies
which go in this direction. Even farmers have begun to understand that
such policies may not be altogether bad for them. However, EU and ACP
banana producers have not yet moved to that point, and fail to be
convinced that direct support might be better for them. They have strongly
lobbied for price-related policies, and in those EU member states which feel
politically responsible to these producers their arguments have won the day.
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the new banana regime was established in the EU. The ®rst draft of the
new regime was designed in the second half of 1992, when the United
Kingdom had the presidency of the EU Council of Ministers. In the UK,
political interests of the former Caribbean colonies and Latin American
ACP countries joined forces with commercial interests of the three UK-
based companies which bene®ted from the old licensing regime. In what is
still seen by some British commentators as a black moment in the history
of UK trade policies, these forces won the day. France, with similar
interests, strongly backed the initial draft. Other EU member states were
strongly opposed to the draft, but did not command a blocking minority.
When, in the ®rst half of 1993, the new regime was ®nally adopted under
a Danish presidency, the blocking minority against it was missed by only
one vote. Denmark, traditionally with a quota-free market, could have
joined the opposition and then the new regime would not have been
adopted. As the country holding the presidency, however, Denmark felt it
needed to show `European responsibility'. Also, Denmark was under heavy
pressure from France and the UK, in relation to completely dierent
political issues. In other words, the EU was not too far away from a
better solution, but historical coincidences got in the way.
Borrell says, rightly, that EU banana policies are a test for policy trans-
parency, and for the credibility of EU policies in general. One hopes that,
one day, the EU will pass that test better than it has done so far. There is,
however, also the issue of credibility vis-aÁ-vis banana producers in EU
territories and in ACP countries. From their subjective point of view,
credibility of the EU required some form of maintenance of the previous
status quo, through policies which did not diverge too much from the
past. As time goes on, EU policy-makers may be able (if they are willing)
to persuade those producers that there are alternative forms of maintaining
credibility, with less economic waste involved. Yet, it appears that this
stage has not yet been reached.
3. Less pronounced negative implications
In assessing the quantitative implications of the new EU regime, Borrell
occasionally takes the situation in 1992 as a point of reference, for
example when he says that availability to consumers declined by 11.5 per
cent between 1992 and 1994. Comparison with the situation in 1992,
though, may be somewhat misleading. In anticipation of the new regime to
come, banana exporters from the dollar zone and respective trading
companies began to increase shipments to the EU signi®cantly in the years
immediately preceding the policy change. As can be seen from ®gure 1,
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unprecedented high levels, before they were forced down again as a result
of the new quota regime. If one extrapolates the trend of imports from
1976 to 1990 to the more recent years (also shown in the graph), it turns
out that even the restricted imports in 1994 were above the longer-run
trend. Of course, this is not to say that the new tari quota regime does
not eectively restrict imports. One also has to consider that `accession' of
East Germany to the EU in 1990 has increased the `natural' volume of
demand for bananas in the EU. Borrell's comparison with the particularly
high levels of imports in 1992, however, provides a slightly misleading
impression.
Another reason why eects of the new regime for exporters of dollar
bananas are not quite as severe as it may appear at ®rst glance is the fact
that some modi®cations were made in 1994. The within-quota tari was
reduced by 25 per cent and the volume of the tari quota was somewhat
increased. Also, under the Framework Agreement negotiated during the
Uruguay Round between the EU and four Latin American exporting
countries, and in force since 1995, the exporting countries involved can
Figure 1 EU-12 imports of dollar bananas
Sources: EUROSTAT, EEC External Trade, CD ROM version, various issues and author's calculations
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thereby reaping part of the quota rent which otherwise would accrue to
importing companies in the EU.
4. The role of the WTO
When considering the GATT/WTO disputes over EU banana policies one
must avoid the impression that they deal with the economics of the case.
The GATT is a purely legal aair, whether one likes it or not. The GATT
has never prevented a country from wasting its economic resources. The
purpose of GATT/WTO disputes is to make sure that countries stick to
their legal obligations and commitments. Whether this is done in a least-
cost manner is a moot issue in the GATT.
In its 1993 report, which still addressed the old regime, the ®rst GATT
Panel on EU banana policies mainly dealt with the national quantitative
import restrictions maintained, under that regime, by some EU countries,
and with the preferential treatment accorded to ACP countries. It found
that the quantitative import restrictions were inconsistent with GATT
Article XI:1 (elimination of quantitative restrictions), and were not
justi®ed by other GATT rules. Particularly important, because the whole
policy of EU preferences for ACP countries was potentially aected, the
Panel also found that EU preferences for ACP banana exporters violated
Article I (most-favoured nation treatment). On this latter point, though,
the Panel suggested that the EU might seek a GATT waiver which might
allow it to provide such preferential treatment.
The second GATT Panel dealt with the new regime established in 1993.
It had to consider a large number of complicated legal issues. It is
important to note that, in its conclusions, the Panel did not ®nd that the
whole of the new EU banana regime was against GATT law, though some
of its elements were found to be inconsistent with speci®c GATT obliga-
tions and commitments (as they stood before the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round). In particular, the substitution of speci®c duties for the
20 per cent ad valorem taris which the EU had bound in its Schedule was
found to be inconsistent with Article II (Schedules of concessions). The
Panel also found that the particular scheme for allocating licences to
trading companies used by the EU was inconsistent with both Article I, as
it tends to discriminate between dierent countries of origin, and Article
III (national treatment), as it discriminates against imported bananas in
favour of domestically produced EU bananas. Finally, this Panel again
found that preferential treatment of banana imports from ACP countries
was inconsistent with Article I (as the EU had still not been granted a
waiver by the contracting parties at the time).
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it to do away completely with its new banana regime. It would have had
to change some of its elements, and it would have had to seek a GATT
waiver for continuing its preferential treatment (as it did, successfully,
towards the end of 1994). However, it would be wrong to suggest that
these ®ndings would have forced the EU to adopt a fundamentally
dierent regime. In particular, the policy alternative favoured by Borrell
(and by myself) would not have been imposed upon the EU by the GATT.
At the time of writing, the third Panel on the EU banana regime has not
yet come to a conclusion. It will be extremely interesting to see how it
argues. Under the new WTO rules the EU will no longer be able to block
adoption of the Panel report, as it did in the ®rst two cases. However, this
time the Panel will again judge exclusively on the basis of legal considera-
tions, and not deal directly with the economic implications of the case.
Contrary to Borrell's view, this WTO case will, therefore, not be `a big test
of . . . the capacity of the WTO to be drawn by analysis of the public
interest' (at least not to the extent that this interest is de®ned in economic
terms). Raising public awareness of the ineciencies resulting from so
many government policies will remain the job we economists have to do.
Brent Borrell has made an important contribution to this process, and by
the comments I have made here I do not wish to reduce the value of that
contribution.
S. Tangermann 282
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997